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I.

THE DEBATE SO FAR

In her 2009 Cornell Law Review article, The Anti-Corruption
Principle,1 and in subsequent publications (including here on Northwestern
University Law Review Colloquy2), Professor Teachout thoroughly analyzed
the text of the Constitution and the records of its framing, primarily relying
upon three clauses3: the Ineligibility Clause, the Incompatibility Clause, and
the Foreign Emoluments Clause.4 This last clause, the Foreign Emoluments
Clause, proscribes (at least some) United States officials from accepting
gifts from foreign governments absent congressional consent. Teachout’s
key insight was to analogize corporate contributions and spending in
domestic elections to these proscribed foreign government gifts. Like
foreign governments, domestic corporations do not owe a duty of loyalty to
the United States. A domestic corporation’s duty of loyalty is owed to its
stockholders, not to our polity as a whole. On the strength of this analogy,
the Foreign Emoluments Clause enjoyed pride of place in her analysis; or,
at least, that is the way her paper was commonly understood.5 Teachout
observes that the purpose, if not the primary purpose, behind these three
provisions (and that of many other constitutional provisions) was to prevent
or limit corruption. On this basis, she suggests that the Constitution
embodies a structural anti-corruption principle. At this very generic level of
abstraction, Teachout and I agree.
*
Lecturer of Law, National University of Ireland Maynooth. Preferred Citation Format: Seth Barrett
Tillman, Closing Statement, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply
to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180 (2013). A fair number of people
suggested sources and sent me comments: I thank you. I also thank Professor Teachout for her
scholarship and participation in our exchange. All errors remain mine.
1
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009) (link).
2
Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 30 (2012) (link).
3
Teachout, supra note 1, at 359 (“Ultimately, three of the biggest protections created by the
Framers were the Ineligibility Clause, the Emoluments Clause, and the Foreign Gifts Clause.”).
4
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (Foreign Emoluments Clause) (link); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2
(Ineligibility Clause and Incompatibility Clause) (link).
5
See Teachout, supra note 1, at 393 n.245 (cited by Justice Stevens in Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(link)).
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But then we turn to brass tacks, including the scope of the
Constitution’s anti-corruption principle: here Teachout and I disagree.
Teachout’s position is that because election-related “corruption” connected
to corporate campaign contributions and spending was unknown to the
Framers and their era, it would be unreasonable to expect the Framers’ text
to deal with this specific type of corruption. Thus it is no surprise that
Congress lacks an express Article I power over election-related
contributions and spending, corporate or otherwise. After all, “it is a
constitution we are expounding,”6 not a prolix document dealing with cases
and situations wholly unknown and unforeseen by those who created it. So
recognizing that the text of the Constitution is a somewhat incomplete
agreement, Teachout turns to higher level principles. She argues that
because the primary purpose of many constitutional provisions was to
prevent corruption, the Constitution implicitly permits Congress to enact
legislation regulating federal (and, perhaps, state) corporate campaign
contributions and spending. In so doing, we moderns would be furthering
the Framers’ eighteenth-century purposes.
There are three primary reasons why Teachout’s interpretive strategy
does not work. First, Teachout misstates the scope of the constitutional
provisions on which her analysis relies. Some of these provisions use Office
language in any of several cognate forms. The particular Office language
used varies from constitutional provision to provision. Other provisions
refer expressly to elected federal officials, with the precise scope of each
clause—what office or offices the clause applies to—varying from clause to
clause. In her Cornell Law Review article, Teachout implied that the
Foreign Emoluments Clause’s proscription against foreign government giftgiving and its Office . . . under the United States language, reaches all
elected federal officials. Here, on Northwestern University Law Review
Colloquy, she has defended that interpretation; indeed, she has expanded on
it by expressly arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office . . .
under the United States language reaches both elected federal positions,
including members of Congress, and also elected state officials. Teachout’s
position is sui generis. The prevailing view is that the Constitution
embraces a global officer–member distinction. So Teachout’s position has
profound implications for both the Foreign Emoluments Clause (and
Teachout’s anti-corruption principle) and for every other constitutional
provision using Office language.
I believe Teachout is wrong about the scope of the Foreign
Emoluments Clause and its Office . . . under the United States language. As
I will explain, my position is that Office . . . under the United States reaches
only holders of appointed federal statutory offices, not elected or
6

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis omitted) (link).
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constitutionally created positions. If my analysis is correct, then the force of
Teachout’s key analogy falls. If, as I have argued, the Framers extended the
proscription against foreign government gift giving to appointed officers
and chose language which did not reach elected officials (although such
language was readily at hand), then the scope of Teachout’s anti-corruption
principle—to the extent it is reliant on the Foreign Emoluments Clause—
would be similarly limited.
Second, the varying Office language throughout the Constitution poses
other difficulties for Teachout’s analysis. Let us imagine the Constitution
had thirty provisions directed against “corruption.” If each of the thirty
provisions used language reaching all elected federal officials, then we
might have reason to conclude that the Constitution embraced a nontextual
or implicit structural anti-corruption principle. And if in the fullness of time
a form of corruption came about which was unknown to the Framers, then
even if such a form of corruption was not squarely addressed by any
express constitutional provision, we might have reason to conclude that the
Framers’ anti-corruption principle would function like an express Article I
enumerated power. Moreover, the scope of that power would permit
congressional regulation in regard to every elected federal office. Why?
Because each constitutional provision which gave rise to the anti-corruption
principle reached every elected official.
Now, let us again imagine the Constitution had thirty provisions
directed against “corruption.” Five provisions relate to House members;
five provisions relate to Senate members; five provisions relate to the
presidency (and vice presidency). A further five provisions relate to the
House and Senate; five more relate to the Senate and President; the last five
relate to federal electors and state elected officials commanding federal
powers. Here the situation is more complex. In these circumstances, if in
the fullness of time we discover a form of corruption unknown to the
Framers, although we might agree that the Framers were against corruption
as an abstract matter, and although we might agree that the Constitution
embraces some sort of nontextual or implicit anti-corruption principle, we
have no clear way to identify the precise scope of that principle. To whom
or what institutions would it apply? Representatives, senators, the President,
the Vice President?
Our Constitution is much more like the one described in the latter
hypothetical, as opposed to the former. Indeed, even when referring to
Officers, the Constitution embraces much diverse language. So the precise
scope of the anti-corruption principle—in the context of corporate
campaign contributions and spending—is something Teachout has to
explain and defend. She cannot argue that every provision of the actual
Constitution covers every elected official. She could turn to the best
analogical clause, but that would be the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/18/
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does not refer to any elected officials. So what is left? She could take a
center-of-gravity approach: most of the most important anti-corruption
provisions embrace most elected officials, at least, in most circumstances.
Such an approach would face many difficult conceptual problems; it would
require the interpreters’ weighing or summing lawmakers’ original intent or
purposes across multiple constitutional provisions. Teachout never gives us
an analysis along these lines. And this is not surprising. The final language
of most (if not all) of the Constitution’s anti-corruption provisions was the
product of debate and compromise. Indeed, the varying Office language
across constitutional provisions is itself some indication that the Framers
actively considered the scope of these provisions. Why vary the language
unless one intended to vary the scope?7 In other words, preventing or
limiting corruption was a goal of the Framers, but it competed with other
principles and policy goals. With regard to each anti-corruption provision,
different compromises were struck and different offices and positions were
encompassed by the scope of each clause. That poses a substantial problem
for Teachout’s analysis. Teachout can argue that the Framers would have
addressed, in some fashion, this issue had they experienced the form of
corruption that interests us here: corporate campaign contributions and
expenditures. But given that minimizing corruption competed with other
principles and policy goals, it is difficult to see how Teachout could predict
what compromise the Framers would have struck had they considered a
problem with which they had no experience. If there is no neutral way to
translate the anti-corruption principle into our modern context and at the
same time to translate the other principles and policy goals with which it
competed, then we are adrift without compass, map, or star to guide us. All
we have is an abstract anti-corruption principle, but we have no way to
determine if it encompassed or should encompass any particular (much less
all) elected positions.

7

Indeed, in regard to some anti-corruption provisions, the Framers had language from the Articles
of Confederation at hand. But they changed that language. Under the Articles of Confederation,
delegates were not “capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for
his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of
1781, art. V, para. 2 (emphasis added) (link). The Incompatibility Clause of the Constitution of 1787 has
no comparable language. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). This illustrates
that the anti-corruption principle played a lesser role in drafting the Constitution of 1787 than it did in
regard to drafting the Articles of Confederation. It also illustrates that the Framers were interested in the
specific scope of such provisions. See generally Martin H. Redish & Elana Nightingale Dawson,
“Worse than the Disease”: The Anti-Corruption Principle, Free Expression, and the Democratic
Process, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1053 (2012) (explaining the prominent role played by special
interests, adversary democracy, and faction both at the Philadelphia Convention and within the
intellectual framework of the Framers and their era).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/18/

183

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

Finally, Teachout argues that the anti-corruption principle is akin to
separation of powers or federalism principles, long embraced by the courts
and the public. She argues that the anti-corruption principle does not rise or
fall with any one or more clauses because the anti-corruption principle
inheres in the Constitution’s structure itself. Even if this is correct, this
position suffers from the same defects as the ones described above.
Analogizing the anti-corruption principle to separation of powers or
federalism only tells us that the anti-corruption principle exists, but it does
not tell us the scope of the principle: does it reach elected federal and state
officials, all or none, or some, and if some, which? Such analogies (at most)
teach us that it is permissible to discover atextual interpretive principles in
the Constitution, but such interpretive strategies do not furnish us with any
guidance as to the scope of the anti-corruption principle itself. More
importantly, unlike federalism, the argument for the existence of the anticorruption principle flows from the individual clauses which Teachout has
so meticulously collected, catalogued, and described. If the scope of those
clauses is not consistently uniform, how can we divine the scope of the anticorruption principle in the modern context of corporate campaign
contributions and spending? And if we cannot, then Teachout’s anticorruption principle cannot contribute to our First Amendment or election
law jurisprudence.
Again, Teachout and I agree that the Constitution’s text embraces an
anti-corruption principle of constitutional dimension. We disagree in regard
to its scope. I believe the scope of that principle extends only to appointed
federal officers; Teachout believes it reaches elected officials. Indeed, last
spring on Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Teachout put
forward a maximalist defense of her position on all fronts.8 Interestingly,
Teachout’s arguments for her maximalist position are largely clause-bound;
she offers no intratextual or global assessment for her position. Teachout
argues that the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office . . . under the United
States language encompasses federal and state elected positions, but she
never discusses how this understanding of constitutional text would
destabilize our understanding of the many coordinate constitutional
provisions making use of the same or similar Office language. In this sense,
Teachout’s position remains woefully undertheorized. Still I am not
surprised that Teachout takes this clause-bound approach. If Teachout is
correct (even in regard to elected federal officials), if the Foreign
Emoluments Clause’s Office language reaches elected officials, then
identifying the scope of the anti-corruption principle would no longer be
particularly problematic. Her powerful analogy between domestic
corporations and foreign governments would largely succeed on originalist
8

See Teachout, supra note 2.
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grounds, and the scope of the anti-corruption principle would be readily
determinable. And that is why—despite some protestations to the contrary
on her part—her defense of her position and this debate remain largely
about the constitutional text and history, to which I now turn.
II. THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE AND ELECTED FEDERAL
OFFICIALS
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.9
The Foreign Emoluments Clause and other anti-corruption provisions
in the Constitution’s text make use of the phrase Office . . . under the
United States or other similar language. In her 2009 Cornell Law
Review article, Teachout implied that state and federal elected offices are
encompassed by this language. But she did not demonstrate why this must
be true. This Office . . . under the United States language appears in the
Foreign Emoluments Clause as well as in the Constitution’s other primary
anti-corruption provisions.10 I have argued that the scope of this
terminology does not reach state or federal elected officials. If I am correct
that Office . . . under the United States extends only to those holding
federal appointed or statutory offices, then her analogy cannot smuggle
any elected officials back into the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause
or the other primary anti-corruption provisions.
Why? Even if the Framers were unfamiliar with the contours of the
modern corporate form, the Framers did know what elected “offices” were
and they knew exactly what corruption was—after all, Teachout’s whole
point is that the world of 1787 was corruption-“obsessed”11 and the primary
“offices” at issue here were created by the Framers themselves. In other
words, if the core purpose of the Foreign Emoluments Clause was to ensure
the loyalty of those holding federal appointed or statutory offices, then even
if corporate election contributions and spending are akin to gifts from
foreign states, it follows that the Foreign Emoluments Clause cannot
9

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
See supra note 3.
11
See Teachout, supra note 1, at 348 (“The Framers were obsessed with corruption.”); accord
Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 70 (2012) (“And most relevant
to the conception of ‘dependence corruption’ that I have advanced here: the Framers banned members
from receiving ‘any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince,
or foreign State’ without the consent of Congress.” (footnote omitted)) (link).
10
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provide the constitutional or textual hook Teachout so desperately needs.12
If (federal and state) elected officials are not Officers . . . under the United
States, the Foreign Emoluments Clause cannot provide a textual foundation
to uphold statutes regulating political activity directed at elections and
election-related conduct. It is that simple.
Last spring, in her 2012 Northwestern University Law Review
Colloquy essay, Teachout argued in express terms what she only had
implied in her 2009 Cornell Law Review article. In the remainder of this
Essay, I will elaborate why I do not find her arguments and evidence
convincing on the merits: why (notwithstanding her objections) I
believe Office . . . under the United States extends only to appointed or
statutory federal officers.
In assessing which position is better supported by the evidence,
Teachout’s position or mine, I frankly admit that there is some evidence on
her side. I do not deny that she has met her burden of production. My goal,
then, is to show that, all things considered, my view is better supported by
the totality of the most relevant textual and historical evidence: evidence
that was roughly contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution.
It is not clear to me if this is Teachout’s methodological position. It appears
to me that Teachout believes if her anti-corruption principle is supported by
any credible evidence, even if it is not the better (or best reading) of the
totality of the most relevant evidence, then the anti-corruption principle
becomes a legitimate interpretive vehicle, structural principle, or canon of
construction, etc. As a normative matter, this position seems wrong. The
fact that a position is historically conceivable or grammatically possible
does not make it a probable or likely13 public understanding of disputed
constitutional text. And, it certainly does not make it the better (or best)
understanding of that text. It would seem to me that that is our goal.
A. The Hamilton List
In 1792, during George Washington’s first administration, Secretary of
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton was directed by the Senate of the Second
Congress to produce a list of “every person holding any civil office or
employment under the United States, (except the judges) . . . .”14 Every not
12
Teachout’s analogy might have some force where corporate political activity is directed towards
influencing a person holding a federal appointed or statutory office. Still, for a strict textualist,
Teachout’s argument is a non-starter. Generally speaking, domestic corporations are not “foreign
States,” and as such, any Foreign Emoluments Clause-based argument simply fails at the outset.
13
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3072 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most
likely public understanding of a particular provision at the time it was adopted.” (emphasis added))
(link).
14
1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 441 (Washington, Gales &
Seaton 1820) (May 7, 1792 entry) (emphasis added).
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some; any not some. Nine months later, Hamilton returned a ninety-page
document that included all those holding federal appointed or statutory
office in every branch, but no elected officials in any branch.15 Not
surprisingly, no state officials were included. These events are roughly
contemporaneous with the enactment of the Constitution and involved an
actor who played a prominent role in drafting and ratifying it. Hamilton’s
response was an official communication from the Treasury to the Senate:
his actions here represent an official Executive Branch construction of
(what is now) contested language.
Teachout has responded with several arguments. Her first theory—that
the salaries of the President and Vice President were widely known and
therefore not deemed to be necessary to include in the report—simply does
not cohere with the known facts.16 Yes, the President’s and Vice President’s
annual salaries were known. They were both set by statute during the First
Congress. But congressional statutes from the First Congress also set the
salaries for cabinet officials.17 Those cabinet salaries were also known. Yet
Hamilton included cabinet members’ salaries, but not the President’s and
Vice President’s salaries. As for Representatives and Senators, they were
paid a per diem, not an annual salary. Their salary—in the sense of what
was actually paid—was not well-known. The only way to know what they
were paid was to research it and report it. Yet Hamilton omitted reporting
any such information—even though he did report what Senate and House
administrative officers were paid.
Teachout’s argument that the phrase “office under the United States”
may have been ambiguous also does not help her cause. If the phrase was
reasonably subject to different understandings, then Hamilton should have
included close cases. After all, functionally speaking, the document’s
intended purpose was to aid congressional oversight and budgeting. Thus, if
there were some doubt or ambiguity whether federal elected positions
were Offices . . . under the United States, such positions should have been
included, but they were not. Teachout could retreat by suggesting that the
phrase was ambiguous, but the ambiguity—although known to her—was
unknown to Hamilton, who acted on a more narrow understanding of the
15

The list included: all cabinet members and other appointed Executive Branch officers, but not the
President or Vice President; clerks of the federal courts, but not the judges (which Hamilton was
expressly asked to omit); the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary’s staff, the Clerk of the House
and the Clerk’s staff, but not the members of the Senate or House or the presiding officers. See Seth
Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle,
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 14–15 (2012), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2012/7/LRColl2012n7Tillman.pdf, reprinted in 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399 (link).
16
See Teachout, supra note 2, at 41.
17
See Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 19, § 1, 1 Stat. 72 (setting the President’s and Vice President’s
compensation); Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 67, 67–68 (setting salaries for the Cabinet and
others).
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scope of the phrase. Such a linguistically specific defense requires some
evidence illustrating Hamilton’s limited grasp of what appears to be
common words and a phrase repeatedly appearing in the Constitution itself.
Teachout offers no such defense. Moreover, even if she is right and this
ambiguity existed but was unknown to Hamilton, why precisely does
Teachout believe her preferred meaning is better than Hamilton’s (except
that it accommodates a maximalist view of her anti-corruption principle)?
Each of the two remaining arguments Teachout puts forward in her
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy essay—that there were
other prudential or political reasons that Hamilton did not include those
salaries or that the context in which the question was asked led Hamilton to
think that it was not intended to cover the President or Vice President—is
conceivable. But, the fact that a position is conceivable does not make it
likely. To shift from the conceivable to the probable, from the possible to
the likely requires evidence. Teachout puts forward none.
B. George Washington’s French Gifts
While President, George Washington received two gifts from foreign
government functionaries: Lafayette gave Washington the key to the
Bastille,18 and the French ambassador gave Washington a picture frame and
full-length portrait of Louis XVI.19 Washington accepted and kept both
without asking for or receiving congressional consent.20 The public knew
about the gift of the key: it was widely reported.21 Many must have known
about the gift of the portrait: it was on display in Washington’s anteroom,
beyond which he entertained official visitors.22 The French coat of arms and
18
See ANDRÉ MAUROIS, ADRIENNE: THE LIFE OF THE MARQUISE DE LA FAYETTE 160 (Gerard
Hopkins trans., 1961) (noting Lafayette’s 1789 appointment as Vice President of the National
Assembly); id. at 162–63 (noting Lafayette’s 1789 appointment (by the King) and subsequent election
(by the Paris electorate) as commander of the National Guard, formerly known as the bourgeois militia);
THE LETTERS OF LAFAYETTE TO WASHINGTON 1777–1799, at 347–48 (Louis Gottschalk ed., 1976)
(reproducing March 17, 1790 letter from Lafayette to Washington giving the key to the Bastille).
19
See Letter from Ambassador Ternant to George Washington (Dec. 22, 1791), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 306, 306 n.1 (Mark A. Mastromarino & Jack D. Warren, Jr. eds., 2000).
20
See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1589 (1798) (statement of Rep. Williamson) (reporting May 4, 1798
debate—more than a year after Washington left office—as the first congressional debate on the Foreign
Emoluments Clause) (link); id. at 1582 (statement of Rep. McDowell) (noting that this was a “new
subject” for Congress) (link).
21
See, e.g., Philadelphia, 12 August, FED. GAZETTE & PHILA. DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 12, 1790,
at 2 (“Last week the key of the Bastille, accompanied with a fine drawing of that famous building, was
presented to the President of the United States, by John Rutledge, jun. Esq. to whose care they were
committed by the illustrious patriot the Marquis de la Fayette . . . .”); New-York, August 10, PA. PACKET,
& DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 13, 1790, at 2 (same); see also STEPHEN DECATUR, JR., PRIVATE AFFAIRS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 144 (1933) (noting that key was on display in a public levee).
22
See, e.g., Letter from Edward Thornton to James Burges (Mar. 5, 1793), in S.W. Jackman, Notes
and Documents, A Young Englishman Reports of the New Nation: Edward Thornton to James Bland
Burges, 1791–1793, 18 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 85, 121 (1961) (writing from Philadelphia: “I don’t
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the King’s initials appeared above Washington’s family crest and
Washington’s initials!23 This is extraordinary probative evidence in regard
to establishing the original public meaning of the Foreign Emoluments
Clause.24
Teachout responds by proposing multiple explanations for President
Washington’s conduct, suggesting alternatively that Washington did not
wish to subject himself to Congress’s oversight and actively chose to evade
the rule; that Washington’s diplomatic role for the young nation prevented
his refusal; that the portrait was not a “present” under then-current
diplomatic conventions; that Washington believed the portrait was a
personal rather than official gift; that Washington uniquely could ignore the
Constitution where others could not; and that the value of the portrait was
de minimis.25 Finally, Teachout suggests: “I am not willing to take a strong
stand on what Washington was thinking when he accepted the print, but it
strikes me as entirely plausible that Washington acted without consideration
of whether the clause applied to him, not based on a thoughtful reading of
the clause.”26
Not one of Teachout’s alternative theories carries any indicia of
support. Some of these theories are evidence-reliant, such as her claim that
portraits were different, i.e., not encompassed by the public domestic
know whether I mentioned to you formerly that the key of the Bastil[l]e, given to a certain Great Man
here by La Fayette is hung up in a glass frame in the principal room of the Great Man’s house with an
engraving of Louis XVI . . . .” (emphasis added)).
23
William B. Adair, A Masterpiece of Artisanship, PICTURE FRAMING MAGAZINE, Aug. 2010, at 28
(describing the print and frame as “an official diplomatic gift”).
24
Evidence arising in connection with the Washington administration is generally considered
superior to that of later administrations. First, Washington’s administration was contemporaneous with
the Constitution’s ratification. Second, the President was a Framer and his cabinet contained other
Framers and ratifiers. Third, the President saw himself above party or faction; indeed, active partisan
federal electoral politics did not arise until after Washington decided not to run for a third term. Fourth,
Washington understood that his personal and his administration’s conduct were precedent-setting even
in regard to what might appear to be minor events and conduct. Fifth, Washington both valued his
reputation for probity and acted under the assumption that his conduct was closely monitored by
political opponents and opportunists. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington
(July 27, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 366 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)
(“You cannot doubt my wishes to see you appointed to any office of honor or emolument in the new
government . . . . My political conduct in nominations . . . must be exceedingly circumspect and proof
against just criticism, for the Eyes of Argus are upon me, and no slip will pass unnoticed that can be
improved into a supposed partiality for friends or relatives.”). Finally, at the time the Foreign
Emoluments Clause was drafted, this internal corruption motivation “was largely not a jingoistic fear—
the United States was too young, in part, but the countries that threatened were countries that many of
the Framers had strong and direct ties to, even affection for—France, most prominently.” Teachout,
supra note 1, at 361.
25
See Teachout, supra note 2, 41–42 (footnote to Tillman omitted).
26
Id. at 42. But see Robert Ralph Davis, Jr., Diplomatic Gifts and Emoluments: The Early National
Experience, 32 HISTORIAN 376, 389–90 (1970) (noting that in 1790, Jefferson consulted Washington in
regard to setting policy involving American gifts for foreign diplomats).
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meaning of “present” or, perhaps, not considered “presents” under
customary international law. No evidence is put forward for this or her
other views.
All her remaining theories to account for Washington’s conduct all go
to Washington’s subjective motivation. Teachout’s analysis errs here. No
one should be interested in Washington’s motivation as a thing in itself.
One is only interested in Washington’s conduct as evidence of public
meaning. The question is not (merely) why Washington did what he did,
but why Teachout is unable to point to any evidence in Congress, or the
press, or even private letters complaining in regard to Washington’s
conduct.
There is a better, simpler view that accounts for the evidence we have
without relying on evidence we have yet to discover. Washington did
nothing wrong within the confines of the Constitution as it was understood
in 1790 (when he accepted the key), or 1791 (when he accepted the
ambassador’s frame and print), or 1792 (when the Senate directed Hamilton
to produce his list). We lack records voicing complaint in regard to
Washington’s conduct because the public had no basis to object to his
conduct. Teachout is unwilling to take “a stand on what Washington was
thinking.” That’s good—because she does not have to.
C. Teachout’s Precedents
Teachout relies upon post-Washington era materials, including state
materials, without explaining why this evidence is more persuasive than the
Washington-era evidence.
Executive Branch Practice. Teachout correctly cites post-Washington
Executive Branch practice where presidents, such as Van Buren and Tyler
in the 1830s and 1840s, sought congressional consent upon receipt of gifts
from foreign governments.27 Likewise, Andrew Jackson received a gold
medal from the South American revolutionary Simón Bolívar, President of
Columbia. In 1830, Jackson submitted it to congressional control.28
Nowhere does Teachout put forward any principled argument for
believing that the Jackson–Tyler-era precedents better comport with
original public meaning than the Washington–Hamilton-era precedents.
State Case Law. Teachout also turns to a variety of cases arising in
state courts involving state constitutional provisions and state statutes using
language roughly comparable to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. I will not
27

See Teachout, supra note 2, at 42.
See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS
AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS 258–59
(Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833) (reproducing Jan. 22, 1834 letter from the Secretary of State to the
President explaining, in summary fashion, the history of the Jackson medal and how it came into the
possession of the State Department) (link).
28
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dwell on this evidence. These citations to post-bellum evidence, in my
view, are almost entirely irrelevant to establishing the original public
meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office . . . under the United
States language.29
She also cites a Pennsylvania case from 1846 adjudicating a statute
from 1839, tested under the Pennsylvania constitution of 1838.30 This is a
half century after 1789. Teachout must explain why these state law
materials discussing analogous state law language are probative or should
be considered in light of competing federal materials from the 1790s.
Like the presidential material which Teachout cites, the state law
evidence she puts forward meets her burden of production. It is interesting,
and it could be used to build a non-originalist argument for how we should
interpret the Foreign Emoluments Clause, given who the American people
are today and how the Republic has evolved. But many have been attracted
to Teachout’s work because of her repeated claim that her research and
analysis is connected both to 1787–1789 and to the Framers’ corruptionobsessed worldview. So, these later materials, in my view, do not make her
case.
The South Carolina Statute of 1787. The South Carolina
Incompatibility Act of 1787 states: “no officer heretofore elected, or
hereafter to be elected, to any pecuniary office in this State . . . shall hold
any other office of emolument under this or the United States.”31 She
argues, as a matter of grammar, that it is reasonable to infer from the Act’s
use of “other” that the “office[s] of emolument under this or the United
States” are elected, just as is the initial “officer” described by the Act. From
this Teachout reasons that “office . . . under this . . . [State]” and
“office . . . under . . . the United States” are not attached strictly to
appointed or statutory offices. If these terms reach elected offices, then the
Foreign Emoluments Clause might embrace elected state and federal
officials. Teachout’s argument might have bite if I had argued that office
under the United States was universally understood as a matter of
eighteenth-century legislative drafting. My position was and is that
Office . . . under the United States and officers . . . of the United States are
terms of art as used in the Constitution of 1787.32 This South Carolina

29
Teachout, supra note 2, at 44 (citing State v. Buttz, 9 S.C. 156 (1877)); id. at 47 n.69 (discussing
State ex rel. Rosenheim v. Hoyt, 2 Or. 246 (1867)); id. at 46 n.66 (discussing twentieth-century case
law).
30
Id. at 45 (discussing Commonwealth ex rel. Owine v. Ford, 5 Pa. 67 (1846)).
31
See id. at 46 & n.67 (quoting Act No. 1368 of 1787, reprinted in 5 STAT. AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 21 (T. Cooper ed., 1839)) (emphasis added).
32
Of course, I am not saying that the Framers acted on a clean slate. Usage similar to that embraced
by the Federal Convention can be found elsewhere, including in prior British statutes. See Tillman,
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statute preceded the Constitution of 1787. In these circumstances, the fact
that its usage may be inconsistent with the Constitution is hardly surprising.
Rather, it would be remarkable if it were precisely consistent at the level of
detail Teachout is trying to impose.
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. Teachout also cites Article II,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution of 1790,33 which she argues
seems to distinguish offices under the United States from appointments
under the United States.34 If the two are different, and not redundant, one
might argue that one of the two categories embraces elected positions. In
other words, one might conclude that office embraces elected positions
because appointed positions are already accounted for. And it might follow
that the similar Office language in the Foreign Emoluments Clause would
also embrace elected positions. Teachout’s position comes without any
extrinsic support and without fully considering alternatives and the
implications of her own position.
Both categories—offices under the United States and appointments
under the United States—may refer exclusively to statutory officers. The
difference may be one of timing: an appointment under the United States
may refer to a person who has received his appointment, but has not taken
his oath of office, at which time he holds an office under the United States.
The distinction may be between those who take office by operation of law
(i.e., succession) and so hold an office under the United States, and those
who receive a presidential appointment, i.e., an appointment under the
United States under the Appointments Clause. This interpretation is
supported by the fact that this provision—in two places—distinguishes
“holders” of office from those who merely “exercise” office.35
More importantly, if Teachout is going to make this sort of fine
grammatical argument, if the text of this provision distinguishes offices
under the United States from appointments under the United States, then it
would appear that this text also distinguishes members of Congress from
office of trust or profit under the United States. If that is the case, then the
Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to congressional elections (and,
by implication, to any state positions).
The Blount Impeachment. Finally, the most significant early American
material discussed by Teachout is the Blount case. In 1797, the House
impeached Senator Blount. House managers brought articles of
impeachment before the Senate and trial proceedings followed. In 1799, the

supra note 15, at 12 & nn.35–36 (2012) (citing ANNE TWOMEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW SOUTH
WALES 438 (2004)).
33
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8 (emphasis added) (link).
34
See Teachout, supra note 2, at 46–47.
35
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8.
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Senate dismissed the case.36 The modern consensus view—with some
support in the ambiguous Senate materials—is that Blount stands for the
proposition that members of Congress cannot be impeached. The problem
with the consensus view is that even if one assumes (which is hardly clear)
that the Senate dismissed the case because it determined that members of
the legislature are not within the scope of the House’s impeachment power,
one has equal reason to assume that the House brought its charges because
it believed that members of Congress were within its scope. I think this is a
fair conclusion, and I see no good reason to believe that the Senate is better
authority than the House.
Teachout takes this analysis one step further. The Impeachment Clause
states: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”37
Teachout’s position is that for the House to have impeached, its members
must have believed that Senators were “Officers of the United States”
within the scope of the Impeachment Clause, and if so, Senators are likely
to be Officers . . . under the United States under the Foreign Emoluments
Clause. The problem for Teachout is that the House records are almost as
ambiguous as the Senate records. We know a majority of the House
supported this impeachment, and we can presume they thought their actions
constitutional. But we do not know why they thought it was constitutional.
It is likely that some thought Senators were officers of the United States (at
least for the purposes of the Impeachment Clause). But it is equally possible
that the House members read the Impeachment Clause as an automatic
removal provision, not a statement as to the scope of the House’s
impeachment power.38 In other words, House members could support
impeaching a senator, even if they believed senators were not officers of the
United States.
36

See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2319 (1799) (recording Senate adoption of a resolution to the effect
that: “this Court ought not to hold jurisdiction”) (link); 2 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 14, at 392 (recording Senate adoption of a resolution on July 8, 1797 to
expel Blount) (link); 3 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 72–73 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1826) (recording July 7, 1797 resolution of the House to
impeach Blount) (link).
37
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (link).
38
See TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
436 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 3d ed. rev. 1872) (“The general power of impeachment and trial may
extend to others besides civil officers, as military or naval officers, or even persons not in office, and to
other offences than those expressly requiring a judgment of removal from office . . . .”) (link); Charles
Pergler, Note, Trial of Good Behavior of Federal Judges, 29 VA. L. REV. 876, 879 (1943) (“[W]e are
dealing with a mandatory requirement, prescribing removal if a civil officer is impeached and convicted
of the offenses . . . .”); see also Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial
Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 66 & n.49, 98 & n.207 (1999) (link).
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There is good reason to believe that the latter view played a significant
role in the House’s Blount proceedings, even if some individual House
members believed that members of Congress were officers of the United
States. If one examines the House’s articles of impeachment, the document
describes Senator Blount as having acted contrary to “his trust and station
as a Senator,”39 not in the language of officer of the United States.40 If there
had been widespread agreement in the House for the proposition that
Senators were officers of the United States, one would think that that
position would have been clearly voiced in the House’s articles of
impeachment, just as any prosecutor would make clear jurisdictional
allegations in his or her indictment.
In fairness to Teachout, I must point out that a majority of (the handful
of) Framers who spoke of the impeachability of Senators took Teachout’s
position. For example, Edmund Randolph argued that the House’s
impeachment power extended to senators.41 Apparently, Randolph thought
the President was an officer of and under the United States and subject both
to the Impeachment Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause.42 Among
the Framers, the only exception seems to be James Monroe, who argued
that members are not impeachable.43 None of the Framers, however, left us
a clear reasoned basis for their views. Here and elsewhere, Teachout’s
position has implications for constitutional law (e.g., the scope of the
House’s impeachment power), quite apart from its First Amendment
implications. Yet, Teachout fails to embrace the task of clarifying to the
reader what aspects of public law will be destabilized by adopting her anticorruption principle.
In short, Blount will remain an enigma. Teachout cannot rely on it to
support her position that members of Congress are officers of the United
States. It may very well have been the case that several House and Senate
members believed that senators were officers of the United States and
subject to impeachment. But we do not know why they (apart from some of
the House managers who acted as prosecutors) believed it. Without
knowing if and why members believed it, we have no means to assess if

39

7 ANNALS OF CONG. 948–51 (1798) (reproducing Blount Articles of Impeachment) (link).
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 app. (1864) (statement of Sen. Bayard) (explaining
that the House’s articles of impeachment nowhere referred to Blount in the language of officer) (link).
41
See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 202 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES] (reproducing
Randolph’s statement at the Virginia ratifying convention).
42
Id. at 485–86.
43
See JAMES MONROE, NOM DE PLUME A NATIVE OF VIRGINIA, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE
PROPOSED PLAN OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Petersburg, Hunter & Prentis 1788), reprinted in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 347, 361 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., N.Y.C., G.P. Putnam’s Sons
1898) (link).
40
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their (purported) view was a reasonable one, much less the best view of the
Constitution’s text as a matter of original public meaning.
III. TEACHOUT AND STATE OFFICIALS
Teachout suggests that Office of Profit or Trust under them, the key
language in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, arguably extends to state
officials, including state elected officials.44 The Foreign Emoluments
Clause is itself joined to the prior Titles of Nobility Clause, which states:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.45
Teachout’s position has some grammatical support. In a federal system,
under the federal entity language might be a term of art reaching the federal
entity and its officials, or it might reach both the officials of the federal
entity and its component states, provinces, and territories, and their
officials.46 That said, her position is against the weight of the evidence;
indeed, it is entirely idiosyncratic. She points to no persuasive authority
suggesting that anyone ever embraced this point of view (until she did so in
2009).
A. The Text of the Articles of Confederation and the Text of the
Constitution of 1787
As a textual matter, the drafters of the Articles of Confederation were
aware of this ambiguity. When they referred to the federal entity, the new
national government, they used United States language,47 when they

44
See Teachout, supra note 2, at 36–39. Teachout believes that my position relies on the fact that
the Framers here chose “them” rather than “it” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Id. That is not my
position. My position is simply that “them” relates back to the Titles of Nobility Clause’s prior use of
“the United States.” As far as I know, the universal understanding of “the United States” (as expressly
and implicitly used in this clause) is that it refers exclusively to federal, not state, positions. Teachout
may be the first to argue otherwise.
45
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
46
See Luke Beck, The Constitutional Prohibition on Religious Tests, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 323, 352
(2011) (“The root of the problem lies in the word ‘under’ [as in ‘under the Commonwealth of
Australia’]. Does it mean ‘of’ such that the prohibition is limited to Commonwealth offices and public
trusts? Or does it mean ‘within’ such that the prohibition applies to state offices and public trusts as
well?”) (link).
47
See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XI (“Canada acceding to this
Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to,
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referred to states they used States language,48 and when they meant both,
they used express language accommodating both. The Articles did not rely
on generic United States language or the word them when referring to the
States as individual entities unless there was some specific referent or
preposition which put the reader on express notice. To cite just a few
examples:
Article IV, Paragraph 1 discussing the “property of the
United States, or either of them;”
Article VI, Paragraph 1 precluding “the United States in
Congress assembled, or any of them, grant[ing] any title of
nobility;”
Article VI, Paragraph 2 mandating that “[n]o two or more
states shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance
whatever between them . . . .”49
The drafters of the Constitution of 1787 followed similar (but not
identical) drafting conventions. Where the Articles conflated national and
state proscriptions into a single clause, the Constitution of 1787 created two
clauses. For example:
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8: “No title of nobility shall be
granted by the United States;” and,
Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1: “No State shall . . . grant
any Title of Nobility.”50
Simply put, the drafters of the Constitution of 1787 did not rely on arguably
ambiguous usage to embrace state officials.
B. Scholarly and Judicial Authority on the Applicability of the
Constitution’s Office-Laden Terminology to State Office
It appears that the earliest scholarly authority to have examined
whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause reaches state officials is Moore’s
all the advantages of this union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same unless such
admission be agreed to by nine states.”).
48
See, e.g., id. at art. VI, para. 1 (“No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress
assembled, shall send any embassy . . . .”).
49
Id. at art. IV, para. 1 (emphasis added); id. at art. VI, para. 1 (emphasis added); id. at art. VI, para.
2 (emphasis added).
50
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (link).
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Digest, a source which Teachout relies on throughout her Northwestern
University Law Review Colloquy essay. Moore’s states that the State
Department, in 1872, took the position that state officials are outside the
ambit of this clause.51 More recent commentators, such as Professor
Rosenkranz, agree: federal constitutional provisions do not reach states or
state officials by implication; only express language will do.52
Teachout urges the reader to expand the reach of the Constitution’s
arguably ambiguous Office language to include state office, in part,
because:
My own experience with politics suggests that complete
awareness of grammar and its implications comes only
when there are particularly highly interested parties (and
there is no reason to think that there was an interested
group of state officials who were aspiring to be foreign gift
recipients), or debate, or a great deal more time and effort
that was spent on th[e] Constitution.53
First, there is good early American, English, and other foreign authority
suggesting that fine linguistic distinctions relating to office and officer were
once readily comprehended.54
More importantly, how much time is a “great deal” of time? The
Framers took four full calendar months: from May 14, 1787 until
September 17, 1787. To me, that seems like a “great deal” of time to adopt
standard usage to be applied to the federal entity and coordinate standard
usage to be applied to the States. And I too can refer to personal experience:
draftsmen-lawyers are loath to repudiate extant language and settled
linguistic conventions. The Articles of Confederation had problems, but I
51
See 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651, at 577 (1906) (“The
provisions of the Constitution ‘neither prevent nor authorize persons who may hold office under any one
of the States from accepting an appointment under a foreign government.’” (quoting State Department
correspondence from 1872)) (link).
52
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1013
(2011) (link).
53
Teachout, supra note 2, at 37 n.34.
54
See 2 DEBATES, supra note 41, at 449–50 (quoting James Wilson: “The great source of
corruption, in that country, is, that persons may hold offices under the crown, and seats in the legislature
at the same time.” (emphasis added)) (link); see also GERARD CARNEY, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT:
LAW & ETHICS 67 (2000) (reporting judicial authority distinguishing office of profit “from the crown”
from office of profit “under the crown” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); John
Waugh, Disqualification of Members of Parliament in Victoria, 31 MONASH U. L. REV. 288, 297 (2005)
(noting that English law distinguished “office of profit from the crown” from “office of profit under the
crown” (internal quotation marks omitted)) (link); cf. Beck, supra note 46, at 351 (“[T]he Australian
Constitution distinguishes between [officers] ‘of the Commonwealth’ and ‘under the Commonwealth’.”
(emphasis omitted)).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/18/

197

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

have never heard any complaint in regard to its having left textually unclear
which obligations applied to the states and which to the national
government.
And if Professor Rosenkranz (writing in the twenty-first century) and
Professor Moore (writing in the twentieth century) seem insufficient, we
can resolve the historical question by going back to a unanimous Supreme
Court in Barron v. Baltimore,55 where Chief Justice Marshall, himself a
ratifier, explained:
If the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections
of the first article [e.g., the Foreign Emoluments Clause],
draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between
the limitations it imposes on the powers of the general
government, and on those of the state; if in every inhibition
intended to act on state power, words are employed which
directly express that intent; some strong reason must be
assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course
in framing the amendments, before that departure can be
assumed.
We search in vain for that reason.56
Of course, it is conceivable that Teachout is correct, as a matter of the
original public meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, and Marshall
was wrong (along with Hamilton and Washington). Teachout’s analysis is
not defeated by the Supreme Court’s nineteenth-century ruling. Rather, the
greater difficulty for Teachout is her inability to show that the voice of the
nation—or any significant part thereof, or anyone at all—rose up to speak
against this aspect of Marshall’s opinion.
Teachout wants us to adopt her theory, not on the grounds that it is
correct, but merely because she has shown that it is conceivable, i.e.,
grammatically Office . . . under the United States could reach state elected
officials, including members of the state legislatures. But for the Marshall
Court and those who came thereafter, this language has not been thusly
understood. So it would seem that Teachout should not be able to rest her
case on purported grammar-based ambiguity alone. All she has established
is that her position is conceivable, not that it is the best understanding of the
language of 1789.

55
56

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (link).
Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
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C. Contemporaneous Practice
Teachout has argued that the Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States language in the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the President,
members of Congress, and to state officials (apparently including members
of the legislature and other elected state officials). The Incompatibility
Clause uses similarly expansive Office language, stating: “[N]o Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office.”57 If we apply Teachout’s
premises, it would appear that the Incompatibility Clause precludes
members of Congress from holding state positions—appointed or elected—
in any branch of state government.
Teachout’s position is contradicted by The Federalist58 and scholarly
authority.59 More importantly, the Incompatibility Clause did not bar
Charles Carroll of Carrollton from simultaneously sitting in the Maryland
senate and the United States Senate between 1789 and 1792.60 Apparently,
he and his contemporaries did not believe that joint service was either
barred by the federal Incompatibility Clause or by its state analogue.61
Subsequently, Maryland amended its constitution to bar joint state–
federal legislative service.62 The proposed amendment passed the state
legislature in 1791; it went into force in 1792.63 This state constitutional
amendment, which was passed after the Constitution of 1787 was made
public by the Federal Convention, followed the drafting conventions
adhered to in the Federal Constitution. It expressly distinguished federal
57

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 64 (James Madison) (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1998)
(“The representatives of each state . . . will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at
the very time be members of the state legislature . . . .” (emphasis added)) (link).
59
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1994) (“The Framers barred Members of
Congress from holding federal executive or judicial offices, but the text they wrote allows joint office
holding between: 1) the Executive and Judicial Departments, 2) the House of Representatives and the
Senate, and 3) the federal government and the states.” (footnotes omitted)) (link); id. at 1050 (“Proposals
to constitutionalize executive-judicial and federal-state incompatibility were made at the Constitutional
Convention and were not approved.”). But see id. at 1047 (“[T]oday we largely understand the
separation of powers to include a one person, one office codicil.” (emphasis added)). Teachout might
latch on to that modern codicil, but that post-1789 view was not part of the corruption-obsessed world of
the Framers.
60
JAN ONOFRIO, MARYLAND BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 116 (1999) (link).
61
Cf. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXVII (“[N]o person, who holds any office of profit in the gift of
Congress, shall be eligible to sit in Congress; but if appointed to any such office, his seat shall be
thereby vacated.”) (link).
62
See id. at art. LXXX (link).
63
Constitutional
Amendments,
ARCHIVES
OF
M D.
ONLINE,
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000380/html/am380p--1.html (last visited
Mar. 18, 2013) (listing ratification dates of Maryland’s constitutional amendments) (link).
58
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from state positions; it distinguished offices under the United States from
members of the legislature:
That no member of congress, or person holding an office of
trust or profit under the United States, shall be capable of
having a seat in the general assembly [i.e., the state
legislature], or being an elector of the [state] senate, or
holding any office of trust or profit under this state . . . .64
After this amendment went into effect, Charles Carroll resigned from
Congress. He retained his state senate seat.65
Charles Carroll was not alone. The First Congress had several
members who concurrently held state legislative seats.66 Likewise, the First
Congress had several members who concurrently held state executive and
judicial office. For example, in 1790, Senator Philip John Schuyler, a U.S.
senator, concurrently sat on the New York Council of Appointment.67
In 1789, the Incompatibility Clause’s Office under the United States
language did not bar members of Congress from holding state positions,
elected or appointed. And that is good warrant for believing that the similar
language in the Ineligibility Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause did
not reach state officeholders. Of course, these three clauses are the primary
constitutional provisions Teachout relies on. If these constitutional
provisions do not extend to state office, then it seems reasonable to
conclude that her anti-corruption principle—whatever its scope—cannot
extend to state office, elected or appointed.
64

MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LXXX (emphasis added).
ONOFRIO, supra note 60, at 116; 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1070 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter 19
DHFFC] (noting Senator Charles Carroll of Carrollton (Md.) concurrently held a state senate seat).
66
See, e.g., 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 774–75 (William C. di Giacomantonio et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter 14 DHFFC] (noting
Congressman Clymer (Pa.) was a member of the state assembly); id. at 706 (noting Senator Schuyler
(N.Y.) concurrently held a state senate seat); 19 DHFFC, supra note 65, at 1070 (noting Congressman
Fitzsimons (Pa.) was a member of the state legislature); id. at 1070 (noting Congressman Huntington
(Conn.) was a member of the state legislative council). But cf. id. at 1069 (noting that the New York
state senate declared Congressman Hathorn, Congressman Laurance, and Senator Schuyler’s state senate
seats vacant, and that the New York state house declared Senator King’s state house seat vacant); id.
at 1070–82 (collecting primary documents suggesting that the New York legislative houses acted under
state constitutional law). There is no example of a house of the First Federal Congress (or a
contemporaneous court, federal or state) declaring joint federal–state legislative service incompatible
under the Incompatibility Clause or under the authority of the U.S. Constitution.
67
See 14 DHFFC, supra note 66, at 706, 709 (discussing Schuyler); id. at 842 (noting Congressman
Burke (S.C.) was a state court judge, “on leave of absence without [judicial] pay during his
[c]ongressional term”); id. at 630–31 (noting Congressman Leonard (Mass.) was a judge on the state
Court of Common Pleas); 19 DHFFC, supra note 65, at 1069 (same); id. at 1069 (noting Congressman
Partridge (Mass.) was a county sheriff).
65
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D. Teachout and The Framers’ Corruption-Speak
Can Teachout make the argument that, apart from the constitutional
text, the more nebulous corruption-speak or worldview of the Framers and
ratifiers is a sufficient basis for expanding the scope of the federal anticorruption principle to state office? That is an interesting question. My own
view is “no.” The expectations, hopes, aspirations, intent, and worldview of
the founders cannot be imposed as “law,” much less constitutional law, if
those mental states were not meaningfully embodied in the formal
constitutional text. If the Framers wanted the primary anti-corruption
provisions in the Constitution to reach state officials, they had ready
language at their fingertips to achieve that end. But they did not make use
of any such language. The better view is that the absence of such language
is some indication that the era of the Framers lacked strong or meaningful
consensus in regard to extending the anti-corruption principle beyond zones
expressly embraced by the constitutional text and circumstances about
which the Framers had first-hand experience during the colonial period and
under the Articles.
But even if I am wrong about this interpretive question, Teachout’s
2009 article was understood as an interpretation of the Constitution’s text,
not as a meta-historical period study. For example, Justice Stevens, in his
Citizens United dissent, cited Teachout immediately before and after citing
to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.68 Why? Because he (and everyone else,
except perhaps Teachout herself) understood her 2009 article to be an
interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and related constitutional
provisions. The original public meaning of Teachout’s prior scholarship
was that she was interpreting the Constitution’s text through the prism of
corruption-speak. If now she takes the position that the anti-corruption
principle is supported only by the Founders’ general intent or purposes or
expectations, then it is unlikely that many who originally embraced her
position will remain supporters.
E. Does It Matter if the Foreign Emoluments Clause Extends to State
Offices?
Teachout argues in the alternative that the anti-corruption principle
remains viable even if the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach state
positions:
In short, even if states were intentionally excluded, [this]
does not constitute an intentional grant of greater power to
68

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51, 963–64 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (link).
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state officials to accept foreign gifts when representing the
country, simply because they cannot represent the country.
Without this intention, even if the “Constitution of 1787
liberalized the foreign government gift-giving regime in
regard to state offices,” this liberalization does not reflect a
lack of concern about corruption.69
Teachout’s historical claim seems dubious. State government and state
officials could use their powers (rightly or wrongly) to check the federal
government and its policies. That is virtually the whole of the fabric of
American history from the Articles of Confederation to 1787–1789, and
then until the Civil War (and some might say into Reconstruction and the
Civil Rights Movement and beyond). Is it really controversial to affirm that
the Framers were aware that the national government being established was
(much like its predecessor) dependent on the goodwill of state government
and state officials? For example, President George Washington consistently
sought the aid of state governors. He did so during the Whiskey Rebellion
and he asked for assistance in enforcing his Neutrality Proclamation.70
Again, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, state governors could fill
Senate vacancies with temporary appointees.71 If a foreign power bribed a
state governor, the foreign policy implications—for war, peace, and treatymaking—are plain, notwithstanding that the governor is not conducting
“foreign policy.”
So, contrary to Teachout, even if a state official was not conducting
“foreign policy” per se, a foreign power’s bribing such a state official could
have serious implications for the peace of the Republic. And such disloyalty
was not beyond the Framers’ imagination: Benedict Arnold, Ethan Allen,72
Blount, and Burr. Today, the foundations of the Republic seem so secure,
and these men occupy only footnotes in our history. But, it was not always
so. There was a time when these men and others like them threatened the
existence of our country.
If one concedes that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach
state office, then it seems unreasonable to assert either that the world of the
Framers was corruption-obsessed or that the scope of Teachout’s anticorruption principle reaches state officials. In 1787, corruption played its
part, to be sure, but other principles and policies also played a role, which

69

Teachout, supra note 2, at 37–38 (quoting Tillman) (footnote omitted).
See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 49 (2008).
71
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (link).
72
See Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past Historical Fact and Fiction: A Response to
Professor Geoffrey R. Stone’s Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture and Essay, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
391, 403 & n.29 (2009) (discussing Ethan Allen) (link).
70
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sometimes trumped corruption concerns.73 Article VI of the Articles of
Confederation reached state officers; its successor, the Foreign Emoluments
Clause, does not. To me, at least, this seems clear.
What might have motivated the Framers to exempt state officials from
the reach of the Foreign Emoluments Clause? I frankly admit that I do not
know. Perhaps it was nothing more than the simple prudential concern of
getting the state legislatures to call state conventions to ratify the proposed
federal constitution. Federal monitoring of state officials, per an Articles of
Confederation Article VI analogue, may have been perceived—by both
state officials and the public—as a source of friction and discord. It is one
thing to put state officials under the thumb of independent U.S. Constitution
Article III courts; it is quite another to put them under the thumb of
Congress. A Foreign Emoluments Clause extending only to some federal
positions risked some corruption at the state level, but it may have made the
possibility of ratification all the more likely.
Why did the Framers exempt federal elected officials from the Foreign
Emoluments Clause? Again, I frankly admit that I do not know. Perhaps
because they left the issue to future congressional rulemaking (for
members) and to statutes (for members and other elected government
positions)? Perhaps because they relied on both disclosure (i.e., Washington
putting the key to the Bastille and the Louis XVI portrait on display) and
elections? In other words, they relied on elected officials to act like
fiduciaries. That is one answer.
Still, I think the answer may be somewhat simpler. It is not uncommon
to treat those at the apex of authority somewhat differently from others—
even to exempt them from burdens which apply to others. Sometimes this is
a reflection of insiders protecting their own. But, it is also frequently a
reflection of deep wisdom: the kind that comes with practical experience in
the world and its affairs. For example, the federal Code of Judicial Conduct
applies to all Article III judges—except members of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Is that because Supreme Court justices do not need
ethics? No. Is it because they are better human beings, citizens, and jurists
than their lower court colleagues? No. Consider recusal when judicial bias
is asserted. Each justice must decide to recuse on his or her own. If an
appeal to the full Court were permitted, then the minority’s ability to
exercise the judicial power of the United States would exist only at the
sufferance of the majority. If an appeal were permitted to non-members,
then you will have effectively transferred responsibility from the Supreme
Court to their minders.

73

See supra note 7 (quoting the Incompatibility Clause of the Articles of Confederation and of the
Constitution of 1787).
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George Washington was not subject to the Foreign Emoluments
Clause. When receiving a gift from a foreign government, his behavior was
public and transparent. Secretary of State Jefferson74 was subject to the
Foreign Emoluments Clause, and he acted in secret. Perhaps the final
language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause reflects the victory of
transparency concerns over corruption fears, at least when it comes to
elected officials at the apex of political responsibility.
IV. TEACHOUT’S ORIGINALISM: ORIGINAL INTENT OR ORIGINAL PUBLIC
MEANING?
As explained, Article VI of the Articles of Confederation flatly
prohibited officers under the United States and officers under any state from
accepting foreign government gifts. The Constitution of 1787’s Foreign
Emoluments Clause expressly permitted federal officers to accept such gifts
if Congress consented.
I concluded that the “modern” clause represents a “reform and a
significant relaxation [from] the strictures of the older clause.”75 Teachout
has argued that I have “misread” the clause and that the new language
represents a codification of “the accepted interpretation of what the [Article
VI provision] required previously.”76 She points to two occasions, after the
Articles went into force in 1781, where the Articles Congress approved
officers’ receiving such gifts. On March 3, 1786, the Articles Congress
permitted John Jay to accept a horse from the King of Spain and also
permitted Franklin to accept a jewel-studded snuffbox from Louis XVI.77
I have doubts that these two decisions taken by the Articles Congress
on a single day establish the “accepted interpretation” of Article VI. It is
possible that the Articles Congress erred or simply believed it had the
power to set the provision aside under a unanimity rule.78 But, it does not

74

Teachout recounts the story of how Louis XVI gave an expensive gift to Thomas Jefferson, the
former United States minister to France, and the then current Secretary of State under President
Washington. Jefferson’s conduct was secretive; he used intermediaries; he actively hid his behavior
from public and congressional scrutiny; he had the gift destroyed. He did so because he knew the
Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to his conduct, even if as a matter of diplomatic necessity he
(arguably) had grounds not to comply. See Teachout, supra note 2, 38–39. Washington’s conduct was
completely different. Upon receiving the gift, he immediately sent a letter in writing thanking the French
ambassador. And, afterwards, he put the portrait on display in his anteroom. See supra Part II.B.
75
Tillman, supra note 15, at 5.
76
Teachout, supra note 2, at 36. But cf. Davis, supra note 26, at 381 (explaining that the Foreign
Emoluments Clause “negated and superseded” the confederation-era practice).
77
See 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 95 (1934) (link).
78
This is not a stretch. Consider: the Articles of Confederation expressly demanded unanimous
consent of the States to substantively modify the Articles. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art.
XIII. Yet, based on a mere unanimous vote of the Articles Congress, the Articles Congress sent the
Constitution of 1787 to the States for ratification. But, the Constitution of 1787 was to go into effect
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matter. Our task here is not to discover what the Articles Congress thought
was the public meaning of Article VI in 1781 (when the Articles came into
effect). Such evidence, at best, goes to the original intent of the Framers in
1787. Rather, our task is to understand what the American public thought
the meaning of Article VI was between 1787 and 1790, the time period
during which the original thirteen states ratified the Constitution, and,
concomitantly, if the public thought that meaning was different from its
successor: the Foreign Emoluments Clause in the Constitution of 1787.
And what did the public think?
As explained, the Foreign Emoluments Clause states: “[N]o Person
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent
of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”79 Between 1788
and 1790, four state ratifying conventions independently sought to strip out
the italicized language.80 In other words, with regard to the specific issue of
congressional authorization, they were attempting to bring the language of
the Foreign Emoluments Clause back to the extant language in Article VI.
What possible reason could they have had except for the fact that the
people, during ratification, thought Article VI’s language was mandatory,
and not subject to congressional waiver? Why else would these four state
conventions, and later members of the House and Senate in the First
Congress proposing constitutional amendments,81 have sought such a
change? In short, the Foreign Emoluments Clause represented—in the
minds of (some of) the people—a relaxation of the strictures imposed by its
Article VI predecessor.
These people opposed that relaxation: they wanted the Foreign
Emoluments Clause to be as demanding as its Article VI predecessor. They
did not get the constitutional amendment they sought. But, they did give us
a good idea of what was the original public meaning of the Foreign
Emoluments Clause and its Article VI predecessor (as understood during
ratification).

when as few as nine states—not thirteen states—ratified the new instrument of government. See U.S.
CONST. art. VII (link).
79
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
80
See 1 DEBATES, supra note 41, at 331 (New York ratifying convention proposing a constitutional
amendment expressly “expung[ing]” the Foreign Emolument Clause’s “consent” language); id. at 336
(Rhode Island ratifying convention doing the same); see also id. at 323 (Massachusetts ratifying
convention proposing a free-standing amendment denying Congress the power to consent); id. at 326
(New Hampshire ratifying convention doing the same).
81
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 761–62 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (Representative Tucker seeking
to amend the Constitution by “[s]trik[ing] out the words ‘[w]ithout the consent of Congress’”); see also
id. at 778 (Representative Gerry proposing a free-standing amendment denying Congress the power to
consent).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/18/

205

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

The Foreign Emoluments Clause was firmly rooted in corruption
concerns, but the public meaning of the text of the clause shows that other
concerns trumped corruption. Teachout puts forward a maximalist
interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Constitution’s
Office language: she argues that this clause extends to state officials and to
all elected federal ones. Likewise, she argues that the change in language
from the Articles to the Constitution did not effect a substantive change.
This is not surprising. Once one accepts any of these textual and historical
limitations on the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, one can no
longer embrace a formless, seamless, free-standing anti-corruption
principle. At most, one will have a textually limited anti-corruption
principle: where the scope of each constitutional provision is limited to the
particular wrongs that were known to the Framers or to the particular
wrongs reached by each provision’s text. In that situation, the anticorruption principle would have very little independent bite, much less the
ability to compete with the First Amendment (i.e., to authorize Congress to
regulate federal election processes).
V. TEACHOUT AND CORRUPTION
Teachout and I disagree whether the Constitution’s primary anticorruption provisions reach state and federal elected officials. If they do,
then Teachout’s domestic-corporation-as-foreign-government analogy has
weight, and her anti-corruption principle has independent bite which,
potentially, could compete against the First Amendment. But, if the Office
language of those provisions—the object of these provisions—does not
reach elected office, then a reasonable person might also conclude that our
inquiry is over. The anti-corruption principle cannot overcome the textual
limitations which inhere in the very constitutional provisions giving rise to
the principle.
Teachout does not agree. Rather, she argues that even if the text does
not directly reach elected positions, the principle reaches them—“directly”
and “explicitly.”82 But how can any principle which arises by inference
work “explicitly”? What does she mean?
I think I know.
For Teachout, the Constitution is not the text; it does not even start
with the text. The real Constitution—the anti-corruption Constitution—is
the great background consensus: the anti-corruption worldview which
formed the prism through which all other ideas and ideals passed.
Teachout never expressly develops any normative framework which
could transmute this free-standing atextual background consensus or

82

Teachout, supra note 2, at 51.
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worldview into “law.” So let’s talk about that. If such a normative
framework exists, what would it look like?
I suppose it would have to be a consent-based theory. There is no
contradiction here. To the extent our “soft” originalist inquiry is textengaged, we can inform our textual understanding based on the public’s
worldview—and yes, the Framers are part of that public. There is no moral
imperative that anyone consented to that worldview for the purpose of
understanding the text because the text itself carries sufficient indicia of
public consent.
But if the worldview itself is set up as creating independent
constitutional norms untethered to the Constitution’s text, then that
worldview must be one that the public engaged and chose. Teachout writes
that “Tillman wants to drag me into a debate about the various uses of the
word ‘office[]’ in the Constitution . . . .”83 That’s not quite right, although
perhaps I have not been as clear as I could have been. The language of
office and officer was coextensive with the language of corruption in the
minds of our eighteenth-century forbears. A person holding an office was a
fiduciary. Such an officeholder owed his principals a duty of care,84
loyalty,85 and good faith86: the very duties private law still imposes on
trustees, directors, executors, and other agents. But a conflicted or faithless
officeholder would be described as corrupt, or, if holding a public office, as
corrupt and/or tyrannical.87 This was the eighteenth century’s vocabulary or
discourse of office. The Framers did not choose it; they inherited it from the
English yeomanry, the Whigs, and from the constitutional settlement arising
out of the ashes of the two English civil wars. Teachout emphasizes that the
Framers’ discussion of corruption bleeds across the pages of the
Philadelphia Convention’s record. It would have been surprising if it did
not: any provision discussing office would have naturally engendered
corruption-speak.
83

Teachout, supra note 2, at 39.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause) (“[The President] shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .” (emphasis added)) (link); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and
the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1142–45 (2004) (discussing the duty of care as applicable to
holders of public office) (link).
85
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (Oaths and Affirmations Clause) (link); Natelson, supra
note 84, at 1146–50 (discussing duty of loyalty as applicable to holders of public office).
86
See, e.g., supra note 84 (quoting Take Care Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he
enter on the Execution of his Office, [the President] shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’”
(emphasis added)) (link).
87
See, e.g., CONAL CONDREN, ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 94–95
(2006); Conal Condren, Public, Private and the Idea of the ‘Public Sphere’ in Early–Modern England,
19 INTELL. HIST. REV. 15, 26 (2009).
84
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I think Teachout is correct: corruption-speak dominated the worldview
of the Framers, and of the ratifiers, and of the public of 1787–1789 (and of
our people for a long time thereafter). But if corruption-speak was the only
prism through which they could understand and communicate about the
language of office and officer—if it was not a discourse they consented to,
not one they actively chose, but a linguistic necessity which chose them88—
then I do not see how Teachout’s anti-corruption principle, standing apart
from the Constitution’s text, can have a normative claim on Americans of
today.

88

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 144 (London, J. Dodsley 1790)
(“It is the first and supreme necessity only, a necessity that is not chosen but chooses, a necessity
paramount to deliberation, that admits no discussion, and demands no evidence, which alone can justify
a resort to anarchy.” (emphasis added)) (link).
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